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Interview
Bridging the Adoption Gap 
for Smart City Technologies: 
An Interview with Rob Kitchin
Katja Schechtner, MIT Media Lab
T he concept of smart cities has become increasingly popular, but it 
seems more difficult than ever to bridge 
the gap between what city administra-
tions want and what developers of 
smart city technologies offer. At the 
same time, citizens are trying to under-
stand how these technologies will make 
their lives better.
Rob Kitchin, a professor and Euro-
pean Research Council Advanced Inves-
tigator at the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth, has more than 
15 years of experience in addressing 
various aspects of smart city concepts to 
create solutions that work for cities and 
their citizens alike. He is (co)principal 
investigator of the Programmable City 
project, the Building City Dashboards 
project, the All-Island Research Obser-
vatory, and the Digital Repository of Ire-
land. Much of Kitchin’s hands-on work 
concerns the development of urban 
dashboards—such as the Dublin Dash-
board (see Figure 1)—that seek to collate 
all of the urban big data produced by 
city systems, along with traditional sta-
tistical and public administration data, 
and to visualize that data to make it 
actionable. Building on this knowledge, 
Kitchin’s team is currently looking at the 
social, political, and economic implica-
tions of creating smart cities as part of 
a recent European Research Council 
grant, and how to build more effective 
city dashboards through a Science Foun-
dation Ireland grant.
It’s with this background in mind 
that I discussed with him whether 
architects and planners and electronic 
engineers and computer scientists have 
a different understanding of cities and, 
if so, how we might bridge the gap.
You have argued that dashboards—
and smart city initiatives in general—
are often underpinned by a naive 
instrumental rationality. What do you 
mean by this, and why is it an issue?
Smart city technologies mostly seem 
founded on a rationality that supposes 
that cities, and their various services 
and functions, can be steered and 
managed through a set of technical 
solutions. In other words, the various 
complex issues facing citizens and city 
managers can be disassembled into 
neatly defined technical problems that 
can be adequately solved through tech-
nology. All that is required to under-
stand, manage, and fix urban issues in 
a rational, logical, and impartial way is 
a suitable technical kit, sufficient data, 
and clever algorithms. In this view, 
urban dashboards provide a set of data 
levers for steering the management of 
the city. The problem with this perspec-
tive is fourfold.
First, a technical approach reduces 
city systems and people to relatively 
simple components and agents. This 
mostly ignores the metaphysical aspects 
of human life; subjectivity; and the role 
of politics, ideology, soft values, social 
and institutional structures, capital, 
and culture in shaping everyday liv-
ing and urban development and gov-
ernance. As such, it’s overly reductive 
and anemic in nature. This is exacer-
bated by a positioning of technology 
as neutral, objective, pragmatic, and 
commonsensical, rather than full of 
choices, values, and politics.
Second, the technical approach 
frames urban issues in instrumen-
tal and practical ways, rather than 
within a wider normative frame-
work. So smart city technologies aim 
to solve questions such as how can we 
optimize traffic? How can we reduce 
energy usage? How can we more 
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effectively police an area? How can 
we increase the efficiency of service 
delivery? The issues might be framed 
with respect to notions of sustainabil-
ity, safety, security, economic com-
petitiveness, consumer choice, and 
so on, but often in a shallow, limited 
sense. For example, developers might 
state that a technology can make a 
system more sustainable, without say-
ing what “being sustainable” means 
beyond instrumental targets. There 
are many conceptions of sustainabil-
ity, and adopting the principles of 
different positions might lead to the 
development of alternative solutions. 
Smart city initiatives then rarely start 
with deeper normative concerns with 
respect to fairness, equity, justice, 
citizenship, democracy, governance, 
political economy, and questions such 
as, “What kind of cities do we want 
to create and live in beyond a limited 
instrumental framing?”
Third, the technical approach assumes 
that technology can fix all of a city’s 
issues, rather than acknowledging that 
some issues might be best solved through 
political or social interventions, collec-
tive action, public policy, investment 
in infrastructure, or citizen-centered 
deliberative democracy. There is often 
a “hammer and nail” mentality in the 
approach adopted—that is, “if one 
makes hammers, then all problems look 
like nails.” In turn, technological soluti-
onism promotes technocratic governance 
that is narrowly and instrumentally 
focused and works in constrained and 
constraining ways.
Fourth, a technical approach can 
often produce what might be termed 
“sticking plaster solutions.” For exam-
ple, technical solutions to traffic conges-
tion are often about trying to optimize 
flow or re-route vehicles. They don’t 
address the deep-rooted problem that 
there are too many vehicles using the 
road system or provide a solution that 
shifts people onto public transport or 
encourages more cycling and walk-
ing. Similarly, we’re not going to solve 
homelessness with an app. It’s an issue 
of social inequalities and often mental 
health, drug dependency, and social 
violence. An app might help manage 
homeless services more effectively, but 
it’s not going to address the underlying 
structural causes.
What the instrumental rationality 
and associated criticisms of technol-
ogy-led solutions to city issues mean is 
that urban planners and city managers 
are sometimes cautious about adopt-
ing them. This doesn’t mean that such 
planners and managers are anti-tech-
nology; rather, they want the optimal 
solution to an issue, which may or may 
not involve technology or technology 
working in concert with other solu-
tions. And they want the technology 
to be open about its underlying ideas, 
rationalities, logics, and limitations. 
For example, with the Dublin Dash-
board, we have sought to be open about 
the aims, principles, praxes, and politics 
of the initiative and to think critically 
about how the dashboard influences 
urban governance.
So beyond an instrumental rational-
ity, do architects and planners and 
Figure 1. The Dublin Dashboard, which “provides citizens, public sector workers, and 
companies with real-time information, time-series indicator data, and interactive 
maps about all aspects of the city” (www.dublindashboard.ie/pages/ContactUs). Rob 
Kitchin is the principal investigator.
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electronic engineers and computer sci-
entists have a different understanding 
of cities?
My impression is that electronic 
engineers and computer scientists 
tend to see the city as a set of know-
able and manageable systems—or 
system of systems—that act in largely 
rational, mechanical, linear, and hier-
archical ways. In addition, city systems 
are largely treated as generic analyti-
cal categories with some typical vari-
ances, meaning a solution developed 
for one city can be transferred and 
replicated elsewhere. And while cyber-
netic approaches recognize the com-
plexity and emergent qualities of city 
systems, they’re still understood as 
being machinic and largely closed and 
bounded in nature. This system view of 
cities is a narrow conception of what a 
city is and how it works.
In contrast, planners and city admin-
istrators understand the city as being 
complex, multifaceted, contingent, open 
and relational, and full of contestation 
and wicked problems. They typically 
see cities as places, not systems. From 
this position, cities have different his-
tories, cultures, social and community 
relations, economies, governance struc-
tures, institutional structures, politics, 
legacy infrastructures, political and 
administrative geographies, and inter-
connections and interdependencies 
with other places. Cities have a range 
of different, often competing, actors 
and stakeholders—government bod-
ies, public sector agencies, companies, 
nongovernmental bodies, community 
organizations, and so on—that have 
different goals, resources, practices, 
and structures and that are trying to 
address and manage various issues. 
This messiness isn’t well captured in 
computational logic and is difficult to 
model, predict, and manage through 
technocratic governance. Understand-
ing cities from this perspective, it seems 
clear that smart city technology won’t 
be a silver bullet to urban issues.
Unlike scientists and engineers, 
who are usually excited about new 
or improved methods and tools for 
planning, monitoring, and manag-
ing cities, there seems to be a lack of 
interest and excitement on the part 
of urban planners and architects. 
Why is this? 
Beyond concerns related to techno-
logical solutionism and instrumental 
rationality, there are a number of rea-
sons that cities are cautious with respect 
to smart city technologies.
The first reason is risk. A city man-
ager will tell you that his or her job is 
to provide stability, certainty, and reli-
ability in the delivery of city services. 
A lot of smart city technology is not 
mature. That is why there is a boom 
in what has been called “experimen-
tal” or “testbed” urbanism or “liv-
ing labs.” Technologies are still being 
developed and tested. They are like 
drugs in the clinical trial phase. Unless 
there is a compelling reason to be a 
first mover, perhaps because a problem 
is so acute that it’s worth taking a risk, 
or a city is trying to gain a competitive 
advantage related to economic devel-
opment, then the city manager would 
prefer to exploit the second-mover 
advantage—that is, the advantage of 
knowing the system will work in solv-
ing a particular problem and improve 
city services. For example, if city man-
agement is going to upgrade 50,000 
lampposts to smart lighting, they want 
to know the system is going to work 
well and do what was promised. They 
don’t want a newspaper headline that 
states, “$15 Million of Taxpayers’ 
Money Wasted.”
Another reason, which is also related 
to risk, is trust. Planners and city 
administrators need to trust that new 
initiatives will work. They have a long 
history of purchasing technologies that 
are costly and don’t always deliver on 
their promises. This includes the wave 
of first-order urban cybernetic systems 
in the 1970s that failed horribly and 
were widely critiqued and abandoned. 
In fact, the move toward a technocratic 
approach at that time created a strong 
backlash in the planning profession, 
moving it to a much more collaborative, 
participatory approach. Some smart 
city technology aims to foster such a 
citizen-led approach by crowdsourcing 
data and opinions and fostering debate, 
but much of the technology is rooted 
in second-order cybernetics and other 
technocratic governance approaches.
A third concern relates to the amount 
of perceived value for money spent and 
the return on investment. Many tech-
nological solutions are not cheap, and 
it isn’t always clear what the return on 
investment will be beyond promises 
that an issue will be ameliorated in 
some way. Moreover, it’s clear that the 
same technology will be cheaper and 
better—in terms of spec, functionality, 
performance—in a few years, so it’s dif-
ficult to know when to make the initial 
investment. Many cities are currently 
operating in a condition of austerity, so 
finances for new investments are con-
strained. As such, although some tech-
nologies could save the city money over 
the long term, the city still must find the 
initial investment capital. This is why 
so much effort is now being expended 
on new business models for smart city 
investments.
Another issue is competing demands. 
City administrations are responsible for 
managing a range of infrastructures 
and services. There are many compet-
ing demands for a limited budget, and 
many of these are statutory obligations. 
Unless a proposed solution will solve a 
critical problem, rather than merely 
offer a nice enhancement, it will have 
trouble competing for attention and 
resources. What smart city technol-
ogy developers versus city administra-
tions view as critical issues can be quite 
divergent.
In addition, city administrations are 
overloaded. Many stakeholders under-
appreciate the extent to which they are 
being bombarded by companies, con-
sultants, lobbyists, academics, and so 
on, all seeking attention for their smart 
city technology. It can be quite difficult 
to work out from the noise which tech-
nology is worth pursuing. City admin-
istrations must be selective; they can’t 
pursue all possible initiatives. 
aprIl–junE 2017 PERVASIVE computing 75
interview
The final issue is inertia and resis-
tance. Like all big organizational enti-
ties, city administrations have existing 
practices and legacy systems and are 
full of internal politics, fiefdoms, and 
competing interests. Workers can be 
reluctant to upset the status quo unless 
what is being proposed is going to sub-
stantially improve existing workflows 
or provide a better solution. In some 
cases, these “better solutions” will be 
resisted, especially if they will lead to 
substantial job cuts.
To promote an understanding between 
the two groups, architects and urban 
planners are usually advised to learn a 
programming language to understand 
the thinking of “the other side.” What 
would your advice be for electrical 
engineers and computer scientists who 
would like to work with cities? 
Rather than start with your ques-
tion, let’s start with your initial state-
ment. Why should architects and 
planners learn how to code? Let’s 
answer that with two questions: 
Should patients train as medics to 
understand doctors? Should the users 
of smartphone apps learn to code to 
use those apps? Or should the doctors 
be able to explain their diagnosis in a 
way that patients can understand and 
trust, and should the app be intuitive 
to use and have suitable help support? 
There is almost a “blame the vic-
tim” mentality in the argument that 
architects and planners should learn 
to code, because electronic engineers 
and computer scientists can’t make 
their rationalities, imaginaries, logics, 
and systems intelligible, or convince 
people that their solutions are better 
than others.
Architects’ and planners’ work is 
to create, build, and plan cities. That 
involves certain kinds of specialist 
knowledges that take years of training 
and experience to develop. Similarly, 
electronic engineers and computer 
scientists learn specialist knowledge 
to produce infrastructure and compu-
tational systems. Yes, they have prag-
matic knowledge of cities based on 
living in them, but that doesn’t make 
them experts with respect to archi-
tecture, urban design, planning prin-
ciples, transport systems, social issues, 
legal and regulatory conditions, and 
the long history of various kinds of 
interventions—both policy and practi-
cal—previously used to try and solve 
long-standing issues. So, should elec-
tronic engineers and computer scien-
tists train as architects, planners, and 
other domain specialisms before they 
start to create technical solutions for 
city problems? Should they understand 
in depth the long history of previously 
attempted solutions and why they are 
suboptimal? Or should they just work 
with people who already have this 
knowledge?
The solution to the gap in knowl-
edge about how particular specialists 
approach urban issues is communica-
tion and mutual learning, not train-
ing to gain the core competencies of 
the other. It’s about working together 
in teams. It’s about doing full require-
ments analysis informed from all 
sides. It’s about respecting each other’s 
perspectives and approaches—and 
there are also significant differences 
in epistemology, ontology, methodol-
ogy, and ethos across disciplines—and 
accommodating different viewpoints 
and knowledge. In our work on urban 
dashboards, this is how we work; we 
have a mixed team of social scientists 
and researchers who are from computer 
science, data science, and geoscience, 
as well as having a partnership with six 
local governments and their domain 
practitioners and Ordnance Survey 
Ireland [the national mapping agency] 
and the Central Statistics Office.
As such, there is a mix of academic 
and technical expertise and many years 
of practical experience of trying to 
address issues on the ground. In other 
words, we are trying to blend episteme 
(scientific knowledge), teche (practical 
instrumental knowledge), phronesis 
(knowledge derived from practice and 
deliberation), and metis (knowledge 
based on experience). We’re also not 
just interested in building dashboards 
but also in asking technical/practical 
questions related to data quality and 
data access. How will the dashboards 
create particular views of the world, 
how will they be used in practice to 
make decisions and to do political work, 
and what will be the consequences and 
ethics of that work? We use a very plu-
ral approach that draws on a range of 
philosophical positions, which we try to 
frame more normatively.
So, my advice to electrical engineers 
and computer scientists is to do two 
things. First, build interdisciplinary/
domain practitioner teams that are 
genuinely interdisciplinary; not teams 
that are heavily science/engineering 
dominated with token social scien-
tists that have very limited roles and 
responsibilities.
Second, understand the critiques 
levelled at technical approaches to 
solving urban issues and constraints 
that are faced by city managers and 
try to find ways to accommodate and 
work around them. My experience is 
that people working for city govern-
ments genuinely want to improve the 
quality of life of their citizens, insti-
tutions, and companies located there. 
If a smart city solution will help them 
do that, while also mitigating against 
constraints, then they are interested. 
But they have to be convinced that 
the final solution will work with few 
unanticipated negative consequences, 
and the value must be worth the 
investment. 
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